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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an approach for modeling and analysis of a number of phenomena of collective
behavior. By collectives we mean multi-agent systems that transition from one state to another at discrete
moments of time. The behavior of a member of a collective (agent) is called conforming if the opinion
of this agent at current time moment conforms to the opinion of some other agents at the previous time
moment. We presume that at each moment of time every agent makes a decision by choosing from the set
{0, 1} (where 1-decision corresponds to action and 0-decision corresponds to inaction). In our approach
we model collective behavior with synchronous Boolean networks. We presume that in a network there
can be agents that act at every moment of time. Such agents are called instigators. Also there can be
agents that never act. Such agents are called loyalists. Agents that are neither instigators nor loyalists
are called simple agents. We study two combinatorial problems. The first problem is to find a disposition
of instigators that in several time moments transforms a network from a state where a majority of simple
agents are inactive to a state with a majority of active agents. The second problem is to find a disposition
of loyalists that returns the network to a state with a majority of inactive agents. Similar problems are
studied for networks in which simple agents demonstrate the contrary to conforming behavior that we call
anticonforming. We obtained several theoretical results regarding the behavior of collectives of agents
with conforming or anticonforming behavior. In computational experiments we solved the described
problems for randomly generated networks with several hundred vertices. We reduced corresponding
combinatorial problems to the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) and used modern SAT solvers to
solve the instances obtained.
Introduction
In recent years the interest to the analysis of various phenomena of collective behavior has significantly
increased. It can be explained by the fact that in almost all areas of human activity there are processes
involving information exchange inside collectives. Such processes deeply affect the future behavior of a
collective and can lead to positive or negative consequences not only for the collective considered but
also for a much larger social formation. For example an intensive sale of shares on the stock exchange
market by players that have a big influence on others can lead to a drastic drop of global economic
indexes. Riots and revolutionary situations proceed in a similar fashion when a relatively small group of
instigators activates such a large number of people that state security systems are not able to cope with
it.
The active development of social networking services in later years greatly increased the possibilities
in collective behavior manipulation. This thesis can be proved by analyzing such revolutionary phe-
nomena as Arab Spring, 2011-13 Russian protests, Euromaidan etc. In the majority of these cases the
corresponding actions were planned via social networks. It is worth mentioning that such processes are
usually coordinated by small groups of designated activists.
The modeling of collective behavior was studied in a large number of papers. Following many other
authors we base our work on the paper of M. Granovetter [1], which studied threshold models of collective
behavior. The threshold behavior means that a state of every member of a group changes only when
the value of a special function, that is associated with this agent, reaches some threshold. The simplest
2example of such behavior is to follow the decision of the majority. In Granovetters model the network
connecting the agents is specified by a complete graph – every agent takes into account the opinion of
every other agent. In many real situations such approach cannot be used. For example, in real world
social networks an agent usually bases its opinion on that of agents from some neighborhood. In this case
the opinion of agents outside of such neighborhood would have no impact on the opinion of the agent
considered. Similar situations can be observed in genetics: in many gene networks the amount of genes
that directly affect each particular gene is small relative to the total number of genes in the network.
Similarities of dynamical processes that can be observed in gene networks and social networks led us
to an idea to introduce and analyze models of collective behavior that are based on Boolean networks.
The apparatus of Boolean networks have been used in mathematical biology for 50 years. Below we
consider the so called synchronous Boolean networks (SBNs) first introduced by S. Kauffman in [2] with
the purpose of analyzing dynamical properties of gene networks. In our approach we consider a collective
as an SBN with special functions associated with the network vertices. From our point of view the
language of Boolean networks is well suited for explaining a number of phenomena of collective behavior.
For example, equilibrium states from [1] can be viewed as fixed points of a discrete function specified by
the corresponding SBN. Another important feature of such models is that to solve combinatorial problems
that arise during the analysis of SBNs it is possible to use modern methods of solving large systems of
Boolean equations. For this purpose in our paper we use algorithms for solving the Boolean satisfiability
problem (SAT).
Let us present a brief outline of the paper. First we describe SBNs and define fixed points and cycles
of discrete functions determined by these networks. Then we introduce two models of collective behavior
that are based on SBNs. In the first model we consider a situation when each network agent at the
next moment of time makes a decision to act if at least a specific amount of agents in its neighborhood
are currently active. Otherwise the agent decides not to act. This form of collective behavior is usually
referred to as conformity. The second model is used to illustrate the phenomenon of anticonformity -
an agent decides not to act if at the present moment at least a specific amount of its neighbors decide
to act and vice versa. After this, we extend the models proposed by introducing two special types of
agents: instigators and loyalists. Instigators are the agents that always act regardless of other agents
decisions. Loyalists are the agents that never act. For the extended models we formulate the following
combinatorial problem: for a network with a majority of inactive agents to find such a disposition of small
amount of instigators, that after several moments of time the majority of agents in this network becomes
active. An opposite problem is also considered: for a previously activated network (with instigators),
to find a disposition of a relatively small number of loyalists, such that after several moments of time
the majority of agents becomes inactive. In the context of problems considered we state a number
of theoretical properties of discrete functions defined by the corresponding SBNs. Then we note that
modern combinatorial algorithms can be used to solve such problems. In particular we use algorithms
for solving SAT. Further we describe our computational experiments and discuss the results. In these
experiments we constructed SBNs according to widely known models of random graphs (Gilbert-Erdos-
Renyi model, Watts-Strogatz model, Barabasi-Albert model). Using modern SAT solvers we managed to
solve combinatorial problems outlined above for corresponding networks with 500 vertices and more. In
the conclusion we give some final remarks and outline our future plans.
Related Works
As we already noted, the paper [1] is the fundamental work in the field of threshold models of collective
behavior. In a number of later works, for example [3–5], the ideas from [1] were detailed and applied to
analysis of various sociological situations.
In [6–9] and others it was shown that various phenomena of collective behavior may be studied from
the game theory point of view. In particular, equilibrium states [1] in collectives can be considered as
Nash equilibria. In this context we would like to mention the work [7] in which the conformity and
3anticonformity phenomena were considered from the game theory positions.
In the paper [10] the influence of thresholds distributions on the genesis and development of several
phenomena (in particular, the so called bandwagon effect) in the networks with arbitrary structure is
analyzed.
As we said above, synchronous Boolean networks were introduced by S. Kauffman in [2]. In that
paper problems of analysis of fixed points and cycles of corresponding discrete functions were considered
as important and helpful for the study of dynamics of real gene networks. Apparently, [11] is the first
example of application of combinatorial algorithms to the search for cycles of discrete functions specified
by Kauffman networks. Later the same authors used the SAT approach for similar purposes [12]. In [13]
we considered the problem of search for fixed points of discrete functions specified by networks, in which
vertex weight functions take natural values and at the same time act as threshold functions. In order to
solve the corresponding problems, we used both SAT and ROBDD approaches. Also in [13] we studied an
opposite problem: given fixed points of the function specified by some network, to restore the structure
of the network.
In recent years there were published a lot of works about the analysis of structure of big networks
and processes that can occur in them. Works [14] and [15] are quite complete reviews of relevant topics.
Models
Synchronous Boolean Networks
A Synchronous Boolean Network (SBN) is defined as a directed graph in which with each vertex there is
associated a total function that takes values from {0, 1} at discrete moments of time. Hereinafter we will
refer to such functions as vertex weight functions. The value of a weight function for an arbitrary vertex
v at moment t+1 is calculated based on the values of weight functions of some set of network vertices at
moment t. In SBNs values of all weight functions are updated simultaneously (synchronously). Note that
the weight functions can be specified in various ways: by truth tables, Boolean formulas or predicates.
Values of weight functions of all vertices at an arbitrary moment t, t ≥ 1 can be considered as a result of
computing a value of a discrete function that takes a Boolean vector of length n as input and outputs a
Boolean vector of length n, where n is a number of vertices in the network. We denote a Boolean vector
consisting of weight functions values at moment t as W (t) and call it a network state at moment t. We
will refer to W (0) as to an initial network state. It is clear that an arbitrary SBN with n vertices has 2n
different possible network states.
Thus, more formally, let us assume that G is a directed graph with n vertices that represents some
SBN. Below we will consider only graphs without loops and without multiple arcs. For convenience let us
mark vertices by natural numbers from 1 to n. With an arbitrary vertex vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we associate a
weight function fvi(t), whose values are defined at discrete moments of time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We assume
that at t = 0 each weight function has some initial value. By Vi we denote such a set of network vertices
that for each vj ∈ Vi, vj 6= vi the graph G has an arc (vj , vi). Essentially it means that Vi contains
vertices that directly affect vi. We also call Vi a neighborhood of vi.
From here on by {0, 1}n we mean the set of all possible binary words of length n. The rules that
specify each weight function fvi , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are the same at any moment of time. It means that in
total these functions specify a vector function that is defined everywhere in {0, 1}n and takes values from
{0, 1}n. We denote this function as FG : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n and refer to it as a discrete function defined
by network G. The transitions between network states, represented by Boolean vectors from {0, 1}n, can
be naturally illustrated using special graphs called State Transition Graphs (STGs). We denote the STG
of network G as ΓG. An example of a simple SBN with 3 vertices where weight functions are specified
by Boolean formulas is displayed in Figure 1.
As we already noted, the amount of different states of an arbitrary SBN with n vertices is 2n, and
4Figure 1. An example of a Kauffman network and its State Transition Graph. The left part
shows a simple Kauffman network with 3 vertices. Weight functions are specified by Boolean formulas
in the right upper part of the figure. The lower right part demonstrates a state transition graph (STG)
for the discrete function specified by this network. It contains one cycle of length 2 and one fixed point.
the rules, according to which the network transitions from one state into another, do not depend on t.
Therefore, regardless of the network state at moment t = 0, there are such k and l, 0 ≤ k < l, that
W (k) =W (l). In this situation we call the sequence of transitions W (k)→ . . .→W (l) a cycle of length
l − k [2]. In some works on the analysis of dynamical properties of gene networks the cycles are called
”attractors”. The cycle of length 1 is called a fixed point of function FG. For the network in Figure 1 it
is easy to see that (000)→ (000) is a fixed point, while a sequence (100)→ (001)→ (100) forms a cycle
of length 2. Note that the neighborhood of every vertex of the network in Figure 1 is formed by other
two vertices.
Models of Collective Behavior Based on Synchronous Boolean
Networks
In this section we introduce and analyze two phenomena of collective behavior that can be observed in
the real world. The first one is conforming behavior. It means that an agent agrees with the opinion
of some agents from its neighborhood. It is easy to find many examples of conformity in real life: from
riots and financial crises mentioned above to presidential elections, etc. The second phenomenon we
study is anticonforming behavior. The agent demonstrating anticonforming behavior acts as an opposite
to an agent with conforming behavior: it chooses not to act while certain amount of agents from its
neighborhood are active and vice versa.
Let us consider an SBN G with n vertices interpreting agents. We will say that an arbitrary agent vi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is active (inactive) at moment t if fvi(t) = 1 (fvi(t) = 0, respectively). We assume that an
arbitrary agent vi is associated with the weight function of one of the following two types:
fvi(t+ 1) =


1,
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (t) ≥ θi · |Vi|
0,
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (t) < θi · |Vi|
(1)
5fvi(t+ 1) =


0,
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (t) ≥ ζi · |Vi|
1,
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (t) < ζi · |Vi|
(2)
where θi, ζi ∈ [0, 1] are called conformity threshold and anticonformity treshold, respectively.
Essentially, (1) means that the agent vi becomes active at moment t + 1 only if at least ⌈θi · |Vi|⌉
agents from its neighborhood are active at moment t. Otherwise vi becomes inactive at moment t + 1.
Hereinafter we refer to such agents as to conformists. Likewise (2) means that vi becomes inactive at
moment t+1 if at least ⌈ζi · |Vi|⌉ agents from its neighborhood are active at moment t and becomes active
otherwise. These agents will be refered to as anticonformists. Values Θi = ⌈θi · |Vi|⌉ and Zi = ⌈ζi · |Vi|⌉
we will call conformity level and anticonformity level, respectively. Further we assume that if Vi = ∅ then
the sum of corresponding weights is 0.
Let vi be a conformist with the conformity threshold θi = 0 and fvi(0) = 1. Then it is clear that
fvi(t) ≡ 1, i.e. that fvi(t) takes the value of 1 at any moment t. It means that agent vi is active at
any moment regardless of decisions of agents in its neighborhood. We will refer to such agents as to
instigators.
Now let vi be an anticonformist with anticonformity threshold ζi = 0 and fvi(0) = 0. Following
the similar reasoning we can conclude that such agent is inactive at any moment of time regardless of
decisions of agents from its neighborhood. We call such agents loyalists.
To an arbitrary agent that is neither instigator nor loyalist we will refer to as a simple agent. Thus
an arbitrary simple agent vi is either a conformist with θi > 0 or an anticonformist with ζi > 0.
In Figure 2 we demonstrate the notation that we use below.
Figure 2. Example of an SBN representing a collective with conforming behavior. This
figure shows a network with different types of vertices. Each vertex represents a member of a collective
(an agent). Crimson vertices correspond to instigators – agents that are always active. Bright green
vertices represent loyalists – agents that are always inactive. The vertex corresponding to simple agent
that is neither instigators nor loyalist is marked with orange if the agent is active and with blue
otherwise. The arcs going from active agents (including instigators) are marked with red. The arcs
going from inactive agents (including loyalists) are marked with green. Each simple agent has a
conformity level.
6The networks with described types of agents can often be observed in real life. Indeed, for example
one can notice that on the early stage of every revolutionary situation there are instigators. Their purpose
is to activate as many initially inactive simple agents-conformists as possible. Once they become active,
conformists help activating other inactive agents-conformists in the following moments of time. This
process gradually involves even agents that are not directly connected to instigators. The goal of loyalists
in such situations is to launch the deactivation process aimed at making active simple agents inactive.
It should be noted that the disposition of instigators and loyalists in the network can significantly
affect the activation / deactivation of the network. In Figure 3 we display the behavior of one network
with two different dispositions of instigators at the initial time moment. The considered networks does
not have loyalists and all its simple agents are conformists. We assume that at the initial moment all
the simple agents are inactive (i.e. for every simple agent fvi(0) = 0). In the first case 5 instigators after
5 moments of time manage to activate only 17 simple agents. In the second case 3 instigators after 5
moments of time activate almost the whole network — 26 simple agents. Important detail here is that
in the first case there is more instigators but their disposition is worse.
Figure 3. The behavioral dynamics of the network under the influence of two different
dispositions of instigators. In the initial state all simple agents are inactive. In the first case (left
part of the figure), 5 instigators after 5 steps activate 17 simple agents. In the second case (right part of
the figure) 3 instigators after 5 steps activate 26 simple agents.
Further we establish a number of theoretical results regarding the dynamical properties of SBNs
with agents of the described types. The main achievement here consists in the justification of the fact
7that the networks in which all simple agents are conformists and networks where all simple agents are
anticonformists can demonstrate completely different activation / deactivation dynamics.
Conforming Behavior
Consider an arbitrary SBN G with n agents. We assume that all the simple agents in the network are
conformists and that there can be instigators and loyalists. Hereinafter we study two problems that we
believe to be interesting from the practical point of view.
In the context of the first problem (to which we will refer below as Problem 1) we consider a network
with n agents among which there can be I, I < n instigators, while all the other n− I agents are simple
agents-conformists. We assume that a priori I instigators can be arbitrarily placed in the network. Also
we assume that at the initial time moment t = 0 all the simple agents are inactive. The goal is to find the
disposition of instigators such that starting from t = 0 the network after some time moments transitions
to the state with a majority of active agents.
The second problem (to which we will refer below as Problem 2) consists in the following: we
consider the network with a fixed disposition of I, I < n instigators and all the other n − I simple
agents-conformists are active at the initial moment t = 0. We assume that it is possible to replace L,
L < n − I arbitrary simple agents by loyalists. We need to find such disposition of these loyalists that
starting from t = 0 the network after some time moments transitions to the state with the majority of
inactive simple agents.
Let us show that the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1. Consider an arbitrary SBN with n agents among which there are I, I < n instigators
and the remaining n− I simple agents are conformists. We assume that at the initial time moment t = 0
all n−I simple agents are inactive. Then for any disposition of instigators and any conformity thresholds
of simple agents the network starting from t = 0 will transition to a fixed point after T ≤ n − I time
moments.
Proof. Assume that G is an SBN with n vertices, weight functions (1), an arbitrary disposition of
I instigators and arbitrary conformity thresholds of simple agents. Suppose that all simple agents are
inactive at t = 0. If after transition from t = 0 to t = 1 none of simple agents have changed their decisions
(0 → 1) then we have a fixed point (since instigators do not change their decisions by definition). Now
suppose that at moment t = 1 some simple agents have changed their decisions from 0 to 1. Let v be
one of them. It means that v has changed its decision from 0 to 1 only because it had enough (relative
to its conformity threshold) instigators in its neighborhood. But since instigators are always active then
the number of active agents in the neighborhood of v at any t ≥ 1 can not be less than that at t = 0.
Therefore this agent will not change its decision 1 at any of the following moments of time. If at moment
t = 2 none of simple agents have changed their decisions then we have a fixed point. Suppose v is an
arbitrary agent that has changed its decision during the transition from t = 1 to t = 2. From the above
it follows that v changed decision from 0 to 1. It could have occured only because it had enough (relative
to its conformity threshold) instigators and active agents in its neighborhood. However all agents that
have become active at t = 1 cannot change their decisions at the following moments of time. Therefore
agent v will remain active at all t ≥ 2. If we continue by analogy we can conclude that not later than
after n− I time moments our network will reach a fixed point. 
Using the reasoning technique from the proof of Theorem 1 it is easy to prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Consider an arbitrary SBN with n agents among which there are I, I < n instigators
and the remaining n − I simple agents are conformists. Assume that some disposition of instigators is
fixed and all simple agents are active at the initial time moment t = 0. Also assume that we can replace
any L, L < n − I simple agents to loyalists. Then for any disposition of these L loyalists and any
conformity thresholds of remaining n−I−L simple agents the network starting from t = 0 will transition
to a fixed point after T ≤ n− I − L time moments.
8Note that the Theorem 1 despite its simplicity makes it possible to explain the situations when a
relatively small number of instigators thanks to their advantageous disposition manage to activate quite
a big network quickly. Apparently, the development of revolutionary situations, epidemics and critical
processes in stock markets proceed in the similar fashion.
The principal possibility of the phenomenon when a small number of instigators can activate the
network starting from the state in which all simple agents-conformists are inactive means that the network
itself is vulnerable to instigators. Intuitively it is clear that such networks can be activated by instigators
even faster if some simple agents are already active at the initial time moment. This thesis is proved by
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume S0(I) is a state of an SBN with n vertices with weight functions (1) and I,
I < n instigators, in which all simple agents-conformists are inactive. Denote by S(I) a network state,
with the same disposition of instigators as in S0(I), in which there is at least one active simple agent.
By W0(T ) and W (T ) we denote states reached by the network after T time moments starting from S0(I)
and S(I), respectively. Then for any T ∈ N+
wt(W0(T )) ≤ wt(W (T )),
where wt(x) stands for a Hamming weight of a Boolean vector x.
Proof. Consider a state S0(I) in which all simple agents are inactive and a state S(I) where some k,
k ≥ 1 simple agents are active. Denote these active agents as a1, . . . , ak. We assume that the disposition
of I instigators is the same in both S0(I) and S(I). First let us prove that wt(W0(1)) ≤ wt(W (1)).
Let us analyze all possible cases. First, both S0(I) and S(I) can be fixed points of FG. In this case
the property holds. If S0(I) is a fixed point and S(I) is not, then even if all agents a1, . . . , ak become
inactive in W (1) it holds that wt(W0(1)) ≤ wt(W (1)). Now suppose that S0(I) is not a fixed point, i.e.
some simple agents in W0(1) become active. It can only occur if they have enough instigators in their
neighborhoods (relative to their conformity thresholds). But it means that the same simple agents will
be active in W (1). Additionally some (possibly all) agents from a1, . . . , ak can become inactive or remain
active in W (1). Also in W (1) there can appear other active simple agents because a1, . . . , ak are active
in S(I). In any case we have wt(W0(1)) ≤ wt(W (1)). Since S0(I) is not a fixed point of FG then some
simple agents in W0(1) become active. Denote these agents as b1, . . . , bs. From Theorem 1 it follows that
these agents cannot become inactive in any of states W0(1),W0(2), . . .. Consider an arbitrary agent bi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and let Vbi be its neighborhood. From the above the number of active agents in Vbi in
states W (1),W (2), . . . is not less than that in Vbi in the state S0(I). Therefore b1, . . . , bs will be active in
all states W (r), r ≥ 1. It means that W0(1) and W (1) can be considered as initial states of the network
with a set of I + s instigators: this set is formed by I original instigators and s new instigators b1, . . . , bs.
After that by analogy we can show that wt(W0(2)) ≤ wt(W (2)), etc. 
Anticonforming Behavior
Consider an arbitrary SBN G with n agents. We assume that all simple agents in G are anticonformists
and also that the network can contain instigators and loyalists.
On the first glance it may seem that the dynamical processes we studied for the collectives of con-
formists should have some simple analogues in the collectives of anticonformists. However, more thorough
investigation reveals that this is not the case. In particular, assume that G is a network in which any agent
vi has a nonempty neighborhood (Vi 6= ∅). Also let this network contain neither instigators nor loyalists.
Then it is easy to see that if all the agents in the network are conformists (with non-zero conformity
thresholds), then the states 0n and 1n are fixed points. However, if all the agents are anticonformists
(with non-zero anticonformity thresholds) then there is the cycle of length 2: 0n → 1n → 0n. Indeed, let
G be the network for which all listed conditions are satisfied, all its simple agents are anticonformists and
they are inactive at moment t = 0. Let vi be an arbitrary agent of the network and Vi be its neighborhood.
9Since Vi 6= ∅ (by assumption), then at t = 0 in Vi all the agents have the 0 state. Therefore for any
value of ζ > 0 we have:
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (0) < ζ · |Vi|, so at moment t = 1 the agent vi will switch its state to
1. Since vi is an arbitrary network agent, it means that at moment t = 1 every agent of the network
will switch to the state 1. Now let us consider what occurs at moment t = 2. Let vi be an arbitrary
agent-anticonformist. Then at moment t = 1 all the agents in Vi are in the state 1. It means that for
any 0 < ζ ≤ 1 the following holds:
∑
vj∈Vi
fvj (1) ≥ ζ · |Vi|. In this situation at moment t = 2 the agent
vi switches to the state 0. But since vi is an arbitrary agent, then all the network agents switch to 0 at
t = 2. Therefore we have the cycle 0n → 1n → 0n.
The following theorem describes the dynamics of collectives of anticonformists with the same initial
conditions as in Theorem 1. It can be noted that in this situation, generally speaking, the collective of
anticonformists has more complex behavior than that of the collective of conformists. In particular, if
the network of anticonformists starts from an initial state in which all simple agents-anticonformists are
inactive, then it may not reach an equilibrium state (a fixed point).
Theorem 3. Consider an arbitrary SBN with n agents, where I, I < n agents are instigators and
the remaining n− I simple agents are anticonformists. Assume that at the initial moment t = 0 all n− I
simple agents are inactive. Then for any disposition of instigators and any anticonformity thresholds of
simple agents the network starting from t = 0 after T ≤ n − I will either transition to a fixed point or
will enter the cycle of length 2.
Proof. Let G be an SBN with n vertices, weight functions (2), an arbitrary disposition of I instigators
and arbitrary anticonformity thresholds of simple agents. Below we denote the set of all vertices of G
as V . Let S0(I) be an initial state of a network with an arbitrary disposition of I instigators and with
inactive simple agents. Let W0(1) be a state to which the network transitions from S0(I) at moment
t = 1. If in W0(1) none of simple agents have changed their decisions (from 0 to 1) then we have a fixed
point. Suppose that m = n − I, m > 0 and r, 0 < r ≤ m simple agents have switched from 0 to 1.
If r = m, i.e. all simple agents have switched, then with the transition from W0(1) to W0(2) all these
agents will switch back from 1 to 0 since in W0(1) each of them has a neighborhood consisting only of
active agents. Therefore in this case we have the following cycle of length 2: S0(I) → W0(1) → S0(I).
Now suppose that r < m. Consider q = m − r, q > 0 simple agents that have not switched from 0 to
1 with the transition from S0(I) to W0(1). It could have occured only if in their neighborhoods there
were enough (relative to their anticonformity thresholds) instigators (which are always active). But since
instigators do not change their decisions, then each of these q agents will not switch from 0 to 1 at any
of the following time moments. Denote by R1, |R1| = r the set formed by all simple agents that have
switched (0 → 1) at moment t = 1. Note that every agent from V \R1 does not change its state from
0 to 1 at time moments t, t ≥ 1. Further let us look only at the behavior of agents from R1. Consider
moment t = 2. If none of agents from R1 have switched (1 → 0) then we have a fixed point (since all
agents from V \R1 do not change their decisions at any t ≥ 1). Suppose that p agents from R1, 0 < p ≤ r
have switched at t = 2 (1→ 0). It is clear that if p = r (all agents from R1 have switched) then we have
a cycle of length 2. Assume p < r, by Q, Q ⊂ R1 denote the set of all r−p agents that have not switched
(1 → 0) at moment t = 2. Consider an arbitrary agent v ∈ Q. This agent has not changed its decision
(1 → 0) at t = 2 only because at t = 1 its neighborhood had enough inactive agents from V (relative to
v anticonformity threshold). However these inactive agents could not belong to R1 (since at t = 1 all
agents from R1 are active). Therefore they must belong to V \R1. But as we noted above all such agents
do not change their decisions from 0 to 1 at any of moments t ≥ 1. It means that any agent v ∈ Q will
not change its decision at any of the following moments t ≥ 2. The set containing p, p < r simple agents
that have switched at t = 2 from 1 to 0 we denote by R2 and further analyze only the behavior of agents
from R2. By analogy we note that each agent from V \R2 does not change its decision at t ≥ 2, etc. Thus
at most after T = n− I time moments the network considered will either reach a fixed point or enter a
cycle of length 2. 
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The reasoning technique from the proof of the Theorem 3 can be used to study the behavior of
collectives of anticonformists, in which there are both instigators and loyalists. In particular, for an
arbitrary network of such kind one can show that starting from the initial state, in which either all simple
agents-anticonformists are active or inactive, the network will transition to a fixed point or will enter the
cycle of length 2 after at most n− I −L time moments, where I stands for the amount of instigators and
L - for the amount of loyalists.
Final Remarks
In this part we presented several theoretical results regarding the conforming and the anticonforming
behavior. From our point of view these results explain a number of phenomena observed in the real
world. In particular, fast activation of a large network by a relatively small number of instigators can
be explained not only by the network structure (for example by its strong connectivity) or by small
conformity thresholds but also by advantageous disposition of instigators. If there exists such disposition
of small number of instigators that forces the network to transition from the state with inactive simple
agents to the state with a majority of active agents then this network is vulnerable to instigators. To
determine the degree of such vulnerability for some particular disposition of I instigators it is sufficient
to study the behavioral dynamics of the network for at most n − I time moments. This fact is the
assertion of the Theorem 1. Evidently, for many real-world networks the vulnerability to instigators is
highly undesirable. On the other hand, as it follows from the Corollary 1, even if the network was already
activated by instigators, but there is a solution of Problem 2, then, roughly speaking, the situation can
be improved by transforming a number of simple agents to loyalists.
Theorem 3 shows that the activation dynamics of collectives of anticonformists can significantly differ
from that of the collectives of conformists even for the similar initial conditions. Unfortunately, we could
not obtain any analogues of Theorems 1 and 3 for collectives in which simple agents are represented by
both conformists and anticonformists. In the section about the experiments we give an example when
such network displays more complex behavior.
SAT Approach to the Study of SBN-based Models of Collective
Behavior
Note that in the real world the conforming behavior is spread much more than the anticonforming. On the
other hand, the collectives of anticonformists demonstrate more complex behavioral dynamics compared
to that of collectives of conformists. It follows from theorems 1 and 3. That is why in our computational
experiments we studied the collectives of conformists and concentrated our attention on Problem 1 and
Problem 2, formulated above. We would like to point out the fact that the considered problems are
combinatorial since they presume the analysis of many possible variants of dispositions of instigators and
loyalists. We applied to Problem 1 and Problem 2 the algorithms that are used to solve the Boolean
satisfiability problem (SAT). This choice is motivated by the fact, that modern SAT solving algorithms
are very powerful computational methods that successfully cope with combinatorial problems from a wide
spectrum of practical areas [16].
For an arbitrary Boolean formula the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) consists in answering a
question if this formula is satisfiable, i.e. if there exists such an assignment to Boolean variables of this
formula, that makes the formula true. This problem in the general case can be effectively (in polynomial
time on the length of a binary encoding of the considered formula) reduced to the problem of deciding if
a Boolean formula in a conjunctive normal form (CNF) is satisfiable. Taking this fact into account, below
we consider SAT in the following formulation: for an arbitrary CNF C over the set of Boolean variables
X we need to answer a question if C is satisfiable, and if the answer is ’yes’, to present a corresponding
variable assignment that evaluates C to 1. This problem is NP-hard, therefore, it cannot be solved in
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polynomial time if P 6= NP . Nevertheless, SAT is very important in a practical sense because a lot of
industrial problems can be effectively reduced to it and solved using modern algorithms developed during
recent 15 years. Basic algorithmic constructions used in solving SAT and main directions of development
and applications of SAT approach are described in [16].
The reducibility of an arbitrary NP problem to SAT (in the form of decision problem) follows from
the Cook theorem [17]. However, in practice the analysis of specific details of the considered problem
makes it possible to significantly decrease the size of the CNF formula produced. A number of general
techniques used to reduce combinatorial problems to SAT can be found in [18].
The SAT approach was successfully applied to the search for cycles of functions defined by Boolean
networks in [12] and [19]. It should be noted, however, that networks studied in that papers have their
own specifics motivated by the source of origin: essentially they are Kauffman networks in which the
power of the neighborhood of an arbitrary agent does not exceed some relatively small number K (usually
K ∈ {1, 2, 3}). Also, weight functions used in [12] and [19] are completely different from the ones we use.
That is why below we present a relatively detailed description of the SAT encoding process for problems
outlined above.
Basic idea that is used to encode many combinatorial problems to SAT, including problems studied
in our paper, is to represent the computation process for the considered discrete function (in our case
it is FG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n) as a Boolean circuit B(FG) formed by logical gates from a complete basis
(for example {∧,¬}). Formally, circuit B(FG) is a directed acyclic graph where n nodes are labeled as
inputs. All other nodes of this graph are called inner nodes. Each inner node corresponds to logical gate
from the chosen basis. Usually, nodes that form the output of the considered function are referred to as
output gates. In our case circuit B(FG) has n output gates.
Circuit inputs are labeled by Boolean variables x1, . . . , xn. Below we refer to these variables as input
variables. An output of each logical gate E is marked by an auxiliary variable u(E). By {y1, . . . , yn} we
denote a set of n variables corresponding to output gates. We refer to {y1, . . . , yn} as output variables.
Let U be the set of all auxiliary variables. Then {x1, . . . , xn} ∩ U = ∅, {y1, . . . , yn} ⊆ U . For circuit
B(FG) it is possible to effectively construct (in linear time on the total number of nodes in the circuit) a
CNF C(FG). The corresponding procedure is based on the Tseitin transformations [20].
Assume E is an arbitrary gate in B(FG). If E is a NOT-gate then it has a single input labeled by
variable p. Then for NOT-gate E we construct a formula u(E) ↔ ¬p where by ↔ we mean logical
equivalence. CNF-representation of a Boolean function specified by formula u(E)↔ ¬p is
(u(E) ∨ p) ∧ (¬u(E) ∨ ¬p)
If E is an AND-gate, and p, q are variables corresponding to its inputs, then for E we construct formula
u(E)↔ p ∧ q and CNF
(¬u(E) ∨ p) ∧ (¬u(E) ∨ q) ∧ (u(E) ∨ ¬p ∨ ¬q)
We say that CNFs constructed this way encode the corresponding logical gates. Then the CNF
encoding circuit B(FG) is
C(FG) =
∧
E∈B(FG)
C(E)
where C(E) is a CNF that encodes gate E.
Once we have a CNF C(FG) we can extend it by adding new constraints in the clausal form that
specify function FG properties we are interested in. For example, a CNF
C′(FG) = C(FG) ∧ C(x1 ↔ y1) ∧ . . . ∧ C(xn ↔ yn)
in which C(xi ↔ yi) = (xi ∨¬yi)∧ (¬xi ∨ yi), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} specifies a fixed point of function FG. To be
more precise, CNF C′(FG) is satisfiable if and only if function FG has fixed points. If C
′(FG) is satisfiable
and its satisfying assignment is obtained, then we can effectively extract the corresponding fixed point:
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it is sufficient to write down values of the input variables. To make a SAT instance that specifies the
problem of finding a cycle of length k we need to represent a superposition
F kG = FG ◦ . . . ◦ FG
as a Boolean circuit.
Instead of logical gates we actually can use more complex basic Boolean functions, such as predicates
over finite sets. In this case elements of the corresponding sets are represented by Boolean vectors. In
fact this is what we do to encode functions FG : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n for networks with weight functions (1)
and (2).
Now let us consider an SBN with n vertices and weight functions (1) that can have both instigators
and loyalists. Assume that the network is functioning for T time moments. The decision of agent vi,
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at moment t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } we encode with Boolean variable xti.
We would like to stress out once more that a priori we do not know dispositions of instigators and
loyalists in the network and therefore presume that any agent can take one of these roles. To take into
account that an arbitrary vertex vi can be either an instigator, a loyalist or a simple agent, we introduce
two additional sets of Boolean variables {ai}ni=1, {li}
n
i=1. We assume that if ai = 1, li = 0 then vi is an
instigator; if ai = 0, li = 1, then it takes the role of a loyalist; if ai = li = 0 then our vertex represents a
simple agent. The situation corresponding to ai = li = 1 would mean that the vertex is simultaneously
an instigator and a loyalist. That is why it is forbidden by means of a clause (¬ai ∨ ¬li).
Let vi be an arbitrary network vertex, Vi = {vj1 , . . . , vj|Vi|} and Θi is conformity level of vi. We
introduce the following predicate
PΘi
(
xtj1 , . . . , x
t
j|Vi|
)
=


True (1), if
∑
j∈{j1,...,j|Vi|}
xtj ≥ Θi
False (0), if
∑
j∈{j1,...,j|Vi|}
xtj < Θi
(3)
Then from the above we can conclude that the decision of agent vi at moment t+1 is associated with
the following formula:
(
xt+1i ↔ ¬li ∧
(
ai ∨ PΘi
(
xtj1 , . . . , x
t
j|Vi |
)))
∧ (¬ai ∨ ¬li) (4)
Additional constraints on the initial network state are encoded in a similar fashion. For example a
constraint that specifies that an arbitrary agent vi at the initial state is active only if it is an instigator
is equivalent to satisfiability of the following formula:
(
x0i ↔ ai
)
∧ (¬ai ∨ ¬li) (5)
In fact, all clauses of the kind (¬ai ∨ ¬li) are added to the result CNF only once.
By applying Tseitin transformations to formulas (4) and (5) we can produce CNFs that are satisfiable
if and only if the original Boolean formulas are satisfiable. To do this we need to be able to effectively
encode predicate (3). It can be represented as a Boolean circuit implementing a function that counts ones
in a Boolean vector and then compares the obtained result with Θi. Such circuit can then be encoded
to CNF in accordance with the procedure described above. However, there are algorithms that produce
more effective SAT encodings for predicates (3). These algorithms are based on various methods that
work with so called cardinality constraints ( [21–25]). In the present paper we encode predicates (3)
using sorting networks. The main idea of the corresponding approach is very simple: we can sort bits in
an arbitrary Boolean vector (α1, . . . , αm) descending from left to right, as we consider them as natural
numbers from the set {0, 1}. Let (β1, . . . , βm) be a result of such sorting. Then it is clear that
m∑
j=1
αj ≥ k,
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k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} if and only if βk = 1. Essentially, in our work to sort Boolean vectors we used binary
variants of Batcher sorting networks [26,27]. SAT encoding of such network with input (α1, . . . , αm) and
output (β1, . . . , βm) requires O(m · log2m) auxiliary variables and O(m · log2m) clauses. SAT encodings
for the constraints that specify that after T time moments the network must contain at least m, m ≤ n
active agents and the constraints of the kind wt(a1, . . . , an) ≤ I, wt(l1, . . . , ln) ≤ L are produced in a
similar way.
It is easy to see that in the general case, if we encode the evolution of network G with n vertices
during T moments of time, then in the CNF obtained the number of variables and clauses will be upper-
bounded by O
(
T · n2 · log2n
)
. Taking into account the theorems proved above for the combinatorial
problems considered we can study only cases when T ≤ n− I − L.
We would like to briefly mention algorithms underlying the solvers that we have used to study the
proposed models. As we said above, the book [16] is probably the most complete source of information
about the algorithms for solving SAT. There are several classes of such algorithms and their effective-
ness is justified by their ability to solve real practical problems. To solve SAT instances encoding the
combinatorial problems outlined above we used modern CDCL solvers, basic design features of which
are described in [28]. This choice is motivated first by the fact that CDCL solvers provide us with exact
solutions, and, second, these particular algorithms successfully cope with many hard SAT instances, for
example, with instances that encode some cryptanalysis problems.
Results & Discussion
Computational Experiments
In our computational experiments we constructed networks according to the known models of random
graphs. In particular we used the Gilbert model [29] also known as the Erdos-Renyi model [30] (see
also [31]), the Watts-Strogatz model [32] and the Barabasi-Albert model [33].
Informally the process of constructing tests for combinatorial problems outlined above for SBNs in
which simple agents are conformists (tests for networks of anticonformists are generated in a similar way)
looks as follows.
1. We generate a random oriented simple graph (without loops and without multiple arcs) with n
vertices, in the form of adjacency matrix where main diagonal is filled with zeros.
2. For each of n vertices we generate a conformity threshold that is randomly selected from [0, 1]
according to the uniform distribution.
3. For a fixed number of time moments T we encode to SAT the problem of search for a disposition
of instigators with given constraints on their number.
4. The CNF obtained is given to a SAT solver.
5. If the SAT solver managed to solve the instance, before exceeding the time limit, and found a
satisfying assignment, then for the instigators disposition obtained we encode a problem of search
for a disposition of loyalists with given constraint on their number.
6. The CNF obtained on the previous step is given to a SAT solver.
7. If the SAT solver managed to solve the provided instance and found a satisfying assignment then
a corresponding disposition of loyalists is extracted.
Now let us briefly describe random graph models that we used. In fact, original models generate
undirected graphs, so we modified them to take into account all features of formulas (1) and (2) (the
neighborhood Vi of vertex vi is formed by vertices in G that have arcs going to vi).
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When generating a graph according to the Gilbert-Erdyos-Renyi model we fix a parameter p ∈ [0, 1]
that is a probability of an arc. Then an arbitrary element gij , i 6= j of an adjacency matrix of graph G
takes the value of 1 with probability p and the value of 0 with probability 1− p.
An important feature of the original Watts-Strogatz model is that random graphs generated according
to this model have the small-world property that can often be observed in real world networks. The
parameters of the Watts-Strogatz model include k, k ≥ 2 and β ∈ [0, 1]. First we generate a regular
lattice network with n vertices, where each vertex vi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is connected with an arc (vj , vi) with
k
2 vertices on either side of vi if k is even. If k is odd then we can consider ⌊
k
2⌋ and ⌈
k
2 ⌉ similar arcs
(vj , vi). On the second stage of graph generation each arc (vj , vi) with probability β is rewired to (vs, vi),
where s is chosen according to the uniform distribution from some subset of {1, . . . , n} in such a way that
in the resulting graph there will be no loops and no multiple arcs.
The Barabasi-Albert model is important because it allows one to generate random networks with scale-
free property. The construction of a network according to the Barabasi-Albert model can be considered
as an iterative process consisting of S+1 steps. On the step s = 0 an initial network G0 with m0 vertices
is built. The result of each step s ∈ {1, . . . , S} is the network Gs which is constructed by adding to Gs−1
one new vertex v′ connected to m ≤ m0 existing vertices of Gs−1. The procedure of constructing edges
(v, v′), v ∈ Gs−1 is probabilistic and is referred to as preferential attachment. According to this procedure
for v′ and an arbitrary v ∈ Gs−1 the edge (v, v′) is added to Gs with probability
Pr (v′, v) =
deg v∑
v˜∈Gs−1
deg v˜
Step s ∈ {1, . . . , S} lasts, i.e. the corresponding probabilistic experiments are repeated, until vertex v′
is connected with m vertices of the graph Gs−1. In our experiments we use the following modification
of the Barabasi-Albert model. An open cycle, i.e. a cycle in which an edge connecting the first and the
last vertices is removed, is used as an initial network G0. On each step s ∈ {1, . . . , S} the probabilistic
experiment is carried out for all pairs of the kind (v′, v) where v ∈ Gs−1, and as a result of the step new
vertex v′ is connected with ≥ m existing vertices. In the final network every edge (v′, v) is replaced by a
pair of arcs (v′, v) and (v, v′).
Defining the conformity thresholds of agents in real networks is a highly nontrivial task and in each
particular case it requires a thorough analysis of the corresponding specifics. Since the main goal of our
computational experiments was to test the general applicability of the SAT approach to the study of the
considered models, we chose conformity thresholds for each vertex randomly.
In the series of experiments we considered networks with 500 vertices. SAT instances were solved
using the Plingeling SAT solver [34] working on 32 threads (two 16-core AMD Opteron 6276 CPUs with
64 GB RAM). The corresponding results are shown in tables 1, 2 and 3.
Below we demonstrate several figures that illustrate the dynamics of SBNs with 30 vertices modeling
the conforming behavior under the influence of instigators and loyalists. In Figure 4 the evolution of the
network generated according to the Barabasi-Albert model is displayed. In Figure 5 we show that some
networks (the particular network displayed was generated in accordance with the Watts-Strogatz model)
are highly vulnerable to the influence of instigators. For the network shown it is sufficient to place one
instigator to activate the whole network in 6 steps. However, it is possible to find such disposition of 9
loyalists that transforms the network to a state with the majority of inactive agents.
Intuitively, one of the most natural strategies of constructing dispositions of instigators is to place
them into vertices with the largest number of outgoing arcs. In Figure 6 (the network is generated
according to the Erdos-Renyi model) we show, that even if we forbid instigators to replace agents with
the most advantageous positions (in the sense explained above), that does not exclude the existence
of other possible variants of dispositions of instigators that transform the network into states with the
majority of active agents. The corresponding constraints that forbid instigators and loyalists to take
place of particular vertices are quite easily encoded into SAT.
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Figure 4. The behavior of the Barabasi-Albert network with 30 vertices under the
influence of instigators and loyalists. In the upper part of the figure the functioning of the network
under the influence of 3 instigators is shown. In the lower part of the figure the functioning of the
network under the influence of 3 instigators and 7 loyalists is shown. Dispositions of instigators and
loyalists were found as solutions of Problem 1 and Problem 2.
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Figure 5. The behavior of the Watts-Strogatz network with 30 vertices under the
influence of instigators and loyalists. In the upper part of the figure the functioning of the network
under the influence of 1 instigator is shown. In the lower part of the figure the functioning of the
network under the influence of 1 instigator and 9 loyalists is shown. Dispositions of instigators and
loyalists were found as solutions of Problem 1 and Problem 2.
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Figure 6. The behavior of the Erdos-Renyi network with 30 vertices under the influence
of instigators and loyalists. In the upper part of the figure the functioning of the network under the
influence of 4 instigators is shown. In the lower part of the figure the functioning of the network under
the influence of 4 instigators and 6 loyalists is shown. Dispositions of instigators and loyalists were
found as solutions of Problem 1 and Problem 2. Instigators could not take place of top 10 vertices
with the largest number of outgoing arcs.
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Also we considered optimization variants of Problem1 and Problem2, i.e. to find corresponding
dispositions of instigators and loyalists of a minimal cardinality. These problems can also be effectively re-
duced to SAT using techniques described above. On the current stage we managed to solve corresponding
problems for networks with 100 – 150 vertices.
Table 1. Results of the computational experiments for Barabasi-Albert networks with 500
vertices
m Pr1 CNF size, Kb Pr1 solving time, sec. Pr2 CNF size, Kb Pr2 solving time, sec.
0 13911.9 31.46 14350.9 1.97
2 22514.6 8.61 22957,4 3.44
4 51694.2 15.81 52187.1 168.73
8 134728.8 57.11 135232.6 342.43
Results of the computational experiments for Barabasi-Albert networks, averaged for 10 tests (for each
value of parameter m). Pr1 and Pr2 stand for Problems 1 and 2 of finding dispositions of at most 50
instigators and at most 100 loyalists, respectively.
Table 2. Results of the computational experiments for Watts-Strogatz networks with 500
vertices
k β Pr1 CNF size, Kb Pr1 solving time, sec. Pr2 CNF size, Kb Pr2 solving time, sec.
10 0.2 53531.1 148.34 54023.1 811.55
10 0.3 51997.7 26.79 52490.8 3098.48
10 0.4 50891.1 16.51 51387.4 172.37
Results of the computational experiments for Watts-Strogatz networks averaged for 10 tests (for each
combination of values of parameters k and β). Pr1 and Pr2 stand for Problems 1 and 2 of finding
dispositions of at most 50 instigators and at most 100 loyalists, respectively.
Table 3. Results of the computational experiments for Erdos-Renyi networks with 500
vertices
p Pr1 CNF size, Kb Pr1 solving time, sec. Pr2 CNF size, Kb Pr2 solving time, sec.
0.01 17983.2 5.63 18425.5 46.69
0.02 51423.8 14.79 51918.6 16.74
0.03 105791.8 25.2 106293.8 34.49
Results of the computational experiments for Erdos-Renyi networks, averaged for 10 tests (for each
value of parameter p). Pr1 and Pr2 stand for Problems 1 and 2 of finding dispositions of at most 50
instigators and at most 100 loyalists, respectively.
In tables 1, 2 and 3 we present the information about the size of encodings and about the time required
to solveProblems 1 and 2 on determining dispositions of instigators or loyalists. We considered networks
with 500 vertices. For each value of parameter p in case of Erdos-Renyi networks, combination of values
of β and k in case of Watts-Strogatz networks, and m in case of Barabasi-Albert networks we generated
10 different tests. Note, that solving time can greatly vary even within one test series (for a particular
random graph model). From our point of view it can be explained by the fact that sometimes randomly
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generated tests are very hard for the particular SAT solver because of heuristics used, while the majority
of such tests are solved relatively fast.
Conclusions and Future Works
In the present paper we introduce the models of collective behavior, that are based on the synchronous
Boolean networks, and study several phenomena related to conformity and anticonformity. In the context
of the proposed models we formulate several combinatorial problems related to the search for dispositions
of agents with special properties (instigators and loyalists) in a network. To these combinatorial problems
we applied modern algorithms for solving the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT).
We do not pretend that the results of our paper can be directly applied to practice since all computa-
tional experiments were performed for artificially generated networks with a random structure. However,
our main goal was to show the principal possibility of solving corresponding combinatorial problems for
networks with hundreds of vertices.
Figure 7. The cycle of length 4 for the network with both conformists and anticonformists.
The agents-conformists are marked with ”C” and agents-anticonformists are marked with ”A”. The
network contains 7 instigators (crimson vertices). At the initial time moment all simple agents are
inactive.
We believe that the use of various SAT parallelization techniques will make it possible to develop our
approach in such a way that it will be applicable to networks with 1000 and more vertices. The corre-
sponding methods will be useful in the study of networks that represent strongly connected components
extracted from the real world networks with a much greater number of vertices. The vulnerability of such
strongly connected components to instigators in our opinion can have highly undesirable consequences for
the corresponding large networks. To extract strongly connected components from real world networks,
one can use methods from [35].
As we mentioned above, determining correct thresholds is probably the hardest stage of construction
of any collective behavior model. In our experiments we generated such thresholds randomly. To study
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real world processes this task should be performed by a specialist in a relevant field of science (such as
economy, biology, sociology, psychology, etc.).
Unfortunately we could not obtain the results similar to theorems 1 and 3 for the networks, in which
simple agents are represented both by conformists and anticonformists. In Figure 7 we show how such
network starting from the state in which all simple agents are inactive enters the cycle of length 4. It
means that these networks display more complex behavior than that described by theorems 1 and 3.
Also it should be noted that the key condition in theorems 1 and 3 is that all simple agents must be
either all inactive or all active at the initial time moment. If we drop this condition, the corresponding
networks can display the behavior different from that described by Theorems 1 and 3. For example in
Figure 8 we demonstrate the cycle of length 3 for the network with instigators, where all simple agents
are conformists, but at the initial state there are both active and inactive simple agents.
Figure 8. The nontrivial cycle of length 3 for the network of conformists with instigators.
At the initial state in the network there are both active and inactive simple agents.
We would like to note that for the models proposed it is possible to study more complex dynamical
properties using the formalism of quantified Boolean formulas with two quantification levels (2QBF) [36].
Suppose that Φ is a disposition of instigators and Ψ is a disposition of loyalists. Then, for example, the
condition that there exists such disposition of instigators, that for any disposition of loyalists the network,
starting from the state with inactive simple agents, after several time moments transitions to a state in
which almost all simple agents are active, can be described using the 2QBF of the following kind:
∃Φ∀Ψℜ (G,FG,Φ,Ψ)
This condition can be considered as an improved variant of condition describing the vulnerability of the
network to instigators. To solve such problems one can use modern 2QBF-solvers [36], [37]. We can also
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take into account any constraints on the cardinality of Φ and Ψ.
Finally, one natural extension of the proposed models is to assign various types of weights to network
arcs and modify vertex weight functions accordingly. Arc weights can represent social pressure, authority,
etc. for each particular member of a collective. In addition to that, it would be interesting to study the
dynamics of networks in which weight function of a vertex can take into account the influence of vertices
that are at a distance > 1 in G from the vertex considered. All the listed aspects can be quite easily
implemented into corresponding SAT encodings. We plan to do it in the nearest future.
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